This one might be a little bit disorganized, as I am writing this from stream of consciousness; I’m thinking this out as I write it.
If my thoughts on Nussbaum’s conceptions of emotions and compassion are at all coherent and accurate, then logically they defeat, at least to some extent, her assertions that compassion involves eudaimonic judgements. This Aristotlelian concept of the pinnacle of human good – the ultimate in human experience and ethics – which has been ably adopted by Nussbaum assumes that compassion must be based upon the wish to see the other experience eudaimonia. This, Nussbaum contends, is the result of the other being of personal importance to the self. To paraphrase Nussbaum, we do not show true compassion for those others from which we are significantly removed. The compassion we show for them is relevant only as far as we keep the distant other in our minds.
This is illogical to me, however. For, emotions in general are only extant for as long as they are in they are relevant to the mind. Further, Nussbaum argues that “the suffering of people” is the object of the emotion, however, as I stated yesterday, I do not believe that to be entirely accurate.